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Abstract
Drawing upon a comprehensive database of contemporary protectionism, this paper offers an
initial assessment of the extent to which our understanding of protectionism may have to evolve.
While some long-standing features of protectionism appear to have endured (such as the
distribution of discriminatory measures across economic sectors), specific corporate needs arising
from the global financial crisis and particular national attributes are more likely to have influenced
the choice of beggar-thy-neighbor policy instruments than binding trade rules and other
international accords.
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1. Introduction. 
The recent global economic crisis has posed a profound challenge to national 
policymakers, but does our understanding of protectionism need to be revised as 
well? Even though no definitive answer to this question can be given yet, enough 
information about contemporary crisis-era protectionism is now available to start 
sifting through the facts and identifying potentially fruitful lines of inquiry. The 
purpose of this paper is to do just that, drawing upon a comprehensive database of 
investigations into over 425 state initiatives announced by governments around 
the globe since the first Group of Twenty (G-20) crisis-related summit in 
November 2008. 
Since the information presented in this paper is current through to mid-
September 2009, the findings contained herein are potentially of interest to 
decision-makers as well as to analysts. Government officials, for example, will 
need to determine commercial policy priorities in the coming months and years, 
not least concerning the possible unwinding of discriminatory measures imposed 
since November 2008. They may also be interested in information reported here 
about the announced, but not yet implemented measures that are likely to entail 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests.1 Scholars and other analysts 
may be interested in the choice of policy instruments and the extent to which 
international accords and initiatives influenced the patterns of state intervention. 
Turning from the positive to the prescriptive, such findings may influence 
assessment for proposals for further international trade obligations in what is 
often referred to as a rules-based multilateral trading system. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section 
the construction by the Global Trade Alert (GTA) team of a database on 
contemporary protectionism, that provides the evidential base for this paper, is 
described. An account of the emerging contours of crisis-era protectionism is 
provided in section three. Some observations are made there concerning what, if 
any, novel features are contained in contemporary crisis-era protectionism. 
Drawing upon elements of the extant literature, section four includes an 
evaluation of four hypotheses concerning the choice of beggar-thy-neighbor 
policy instruments during the current crisis. An evidence-based evaluation of the 
effectiveness of binding trade rules and the G-20 countries' no-protectionism 
pledge is presented in section five. Concluding remarks are offered in section six. 
                                                
1 In this paper such measures are referred to as the protectionist pipeline or the protectionist 
measures in the pipeline.  
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2. The Global Trade Alert's database on contemporary protectionism. 
During the first half of 2009 many nations experienced substantial year-on-year 
reductions in their exports. Japanese exports, for example, fell by half. Concerns 
that such export contractions would be exacerbated by the widespread resort to 
protectionism lead a group of trade policy analysts, independent from government 
and international organizations, to establish an initiative to monitor whether state 
initiatives were being introduced that tilted the playing field against foreign 
commercial interests. The Global Trade Alert was organized and officially 
launched on 8 June 2009. 
By the middle of September 2009 the GTA team had investigated over 425 
state measures and posted reports on each of them on its dedicated website, 
www.globaltradealert.org. Two written reports have also been published, the 
second of which has been referred to as "authoritative."2 Usage of the website, 
which includes a summary statistics page whereby country-specific, sector-
specific, and policy instrument-specific information can be readily downloaded, 
has been extensive. By the end of September 2009, less than four months into the 
initiative's existence, over 3000 distinct users have consulted the GTA database 
nine or more times, suggesting frequent usage by a not inconsiderable portion of 
the community of trade policy analysts.3 Several governments have sought 
memoranda and presentations from the GTA team. 
The unit of observation in the GTA database is a (typically unilateral4) state 
initiative that at the time of its announcement might have implications for foreign 
commercial interests, the latter broadly conceived to include migrant workers, 
intellectual property deployed abroad, foreign investments as well as imports and 
exports. The GTA takes as a starting point state initiatives announced during or 
after November 2008 because in that month many heads of government 
committed themselves in international meetings (including the first crisis-related 
G-20 summit in Washington, D.C.) to eschew protectionism during this global 
                                                
2 The second report of the Global Trade Alert can be downloaded at the following URL: 
http://www.globaltradealert.org/gta-analysis/broken-promises-g20-summit-report-global-trade-
alert
3 The size of this community has not been estimated with any precision. The author has consulted 
a number of trade analysts about this matter and estimates of the total number of persons 
worldwide likely to find the GTA database of regular interest vary from 5,000 to 20,000.  
4 The negotiation and conclusion of free trade agreements, bilateral investment treaties, and double 
taxation treaties are therefore outside of the scope of the GTA database. This design choice was 
made deliberately so that the focus would be on the unilateral state acts that governments 
undertake during the current global economic crisis. Having said that, there are a few instances 
where two or more governments have agreed to "manage trade" in a sector that are recorded in the 
GTA database. 
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economic downturn.5 Had available resources permitted, it would be have been 
desirable to extend the database back to the onset of the subprime crisis in the 
third quarter of 2007 and possibly before (to provide a pre-crisis benchmark). 
A state initiative could be as broad in scope as a state budget (so containing 
changes to many trade-related policy instruments) or as narrow as a tariff increase 
on a single product. The total number of policy instruments altered, therefore, 
exceeds the number of state initiatives reported in the GTA database, so the latter 
should not be taken as an indication of the former. No assumption is made that 
each initiative is comparable to every other initiative, although it is possible to 
sensibly group together initiatives involving the same policy instrument (such as 
anti-dumping investigations) and to distinguish some sets of initiatives from 
others (such as tariff increases from public procurement-related measures). 
Indeed, as described below, there is no presumption that the harm done by state 
initiatives, including those comprising the same types of policy instrument, is the 
same. 
The GTA team comprises independent trade policy analysts from across the 
globe. When a team member spots an announcement of a potentially relevant state 
initiative (on a website, in newspapers and periodicals, and in the reports of 
national governments and international organizations), the first step taken is to 
verify the facts contained therein are consistent with information available from 
official sources. Occasionally, when verification from official sources is not 
possible, private sector traders are consulted to determine if there has been, or is 
planned, a change in state policy. The facts uncovered are used to ascertain 
whether the implementation of the state initiative in question would alter the 
relative treatment of the domestic and foreign commercial interests operating in 
the markets where the initiative's effects will be felt. In common parlance the 
GTA checks whether the state initiative tilts the "playing field" against foreign 
commercial interests.  
A traffic light system was developed so that each initiative can be 
categorized in terms of its effects on foreign commercial interests: a red 
evaluation indicates that the initiative has been implemented and is almost 
certainly discriminatory; amber that either the initiative has yet to be implemented 
and once in force will almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial 
interests, or the initiative has been implemented and is likely to be discriminatory, 
or the initiative contains a mix of policy interventions some that are 
discriminatory and some that are not. A green evaluation is given to an initiative 
that is either non-discriminatory, involves liberalization on a non-discriminatory 
                                                
5 The November 2008 start date almost certainly implies that there are some financial sector 
bailouts that are not contained in the GTA database. Even so, the number of state aids, bailouts, 
and financial assistance in the GTA database exceeds the number of every other policy instrument 
reported therein. 
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(Most Favored Nation basis), or improves the transparency of aspects of the 
national trade regime.6 
It should be borne in mind that the metric used to evaluate a state initiative 
relates to its potential for discrimination against foreign commercial interests. 
That is, a GTA investigation examines whether there is any change in the relative 
treatment between domestic and foreign commercial interests or between foreign 
commercial interests. Reported investigations take no position on whether a state 
initiative is WTO-legal, "crisis-related," "appropriate," "effective," or 
"reasonable," other metrics that some may prefer (and care to define.) It is 
possible that a state initiative is discriminatory and yet motivated by a benign 
non-protectionist goal. The GTA takes no position on the motives of a 
government. However, when a government states a benign rationale for an 
initiative that claim is recorded in the description of the initiative found on the 
GTA website.7 
GTA investigations also report what is known publicly about the process of 
deliberation pursued by a government as it takes decisions with respect to a 
specific state initiative. This helps users assess whether a government consulted 
scientific evidence when making its determinations, whether it offered a rationale 
for the policy instruments chosen, and whether the impact of different instruments 
on foreign commercial interests was taken into account. In this manner users can 
judge whether a government used available scientific evidence to choose policy 
instruments that minimized the harm done to trading partners and were 
transparent in doing so. 
With respect to the potential effects of a state initiative, the GTA takes a 
cautious, multi-faceted approach.8 In a perfect world it would have been desirable 
                                                
6 Each evaluation of a state measure must be approved by the GTA's Evaluation Group, 
comprising all of the senior analysts associated with the initiative. 
7 Sometimes a member of the trade policy community asserts that a given measure is legitimate or 
different or justified and should not be included among a list of discriminatory state measures. The 
GTA team takes no position on the validity of these assertions. Having said that, the "advanced 
search" page of the GTA website has been deliberately designed so that a user can extract 
information from the database excluding a given type of state measure. Moreover, most of the 
tables that the "statistics" page of the GTA website generates reports the total number of measures 
meeting whatever criteria is sought and the total number of measures other than trade remedies. 
The latter distinction is made because some assert that trade remedies (anti-dumping, 
countervailing duties, and safeguards measures) are somehow legitimate or different. As will 
become clear, removing trade remedies from the summary statistics for discriminatory measures 
imposed in the year November 2008-September 2009 does not make much difference at all, 
precisely because there were so few of the former. It will also become apparent that for the 6-12 
months from September 2009, if the already announced trade remedy investigated are completed 
then the imposition of discriminatory trade remedy measures will become much more prevalent. 
8 In the GTA database a measure undertaken by the European Commission on behalf of the 27 
member states is attributed to each one of the latter. When other jurisdictions take measures 
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to conduct a full-blown economic analysis of the effects of each state initiative. 
Leaving aside the matter of available data and resources, the time taken to 
conduct economic analyses is such that a comprehensive set of results on the 
effects of contemporary protectionism is unlikely to be available in time to inform 
policymaking during the global economic downturn and any subsequent 
recovery.9 Recognizing this, the GTA provides information on a number of 
dimensions of the likely impact of a state initiative. Each state initiative is 
examined carefully to identify which tariff lines, trading partners, and economic 
sectors would be affected by its implementation. Available data on trade and 
investment flows, on foreign affiliates of multinational corporations, and on 
stocks of migrants are used to identify those trading partners that currently have a 
commercial interest in the sectors or tariff lines likely to be affected by a given 
state initiative.10 The identities of those trading partners are recorded in the GTA 
                                                                                                                                     
against the European Union (EU) the identities of the affected member states are sought and the 
latter are listed as the affected trading partners in the GTA database rather than the European 
Communities (as the EU is referred to still in trade circles). In the rare cases where such identities 
cannot be established, the European Communities is listed as the affected trading partner. It being 
the case that individual member states may take their own crisis-related measures that affect 
foreign commercial interests (such as buy national public procurement policies), a deliberate 
choice was made to list each member state in the GTA database as both a potential implementing 
jurisdiction and an affected trading partner. At the request of several users, the summary statistics 
and advanced search pages of the GTA website have been configured to allow for searches 
involving the 27 members of the EU member states. 
9 This is not an argument against economic evaluations per se. It is an argument, though, to 
counter the tendency of some analysts who downplay the impact of contemporary protectionism 
just because many economic studies of potentially discriminatory state initiatives have not been 
conducted. There is plenty of evidence, short of detailed empirical studies, that can be carefully 
collected by trade policy analysts which can usefully inform policymakers during a systemic 
crisis. Researchers should not fall into the trap of making the perfect the enemy of the very good. 
10 Some have argued that the GTA team should go further and report the amount of commerce 
affected or potentially affected by each state measure. Adding up across the different measures, so 
the argument does, might provide another summary indicator of the reach of contemporary 
protectionism. There are a number of reasons (a few of which are presented below) why this 
apparently appealing idea is either likely to be implemented and interpreted in a misleading 
manner or very hard to implement at all. One concern is that the measures do not just affect 
imports and exports. So how would one add the trade impact to the impact on foreign investors 
and owners of intellectual property to the impact on migrants, bearing in mind that many of the 
latter variables are not measured in the same flow terms as trade? Once the foolishness of adding 
apples to oranges becomes apparent, there is a risk that only the totals for the apples or the oranges 
are reported, so understating the amount of international commerce affected by contemporary 
protectionism. Another concern, even in trade in goods, is how to value the amount of global 
commerce that might be affected by export-promoting policy instruments. Surely the correct 
number is not the total value of exports from the jurisdiction implementing the policy instrument 
in question of the goods that might benefit from that instrument? If not, which foreign trading 
partners are taken to be competitors and in which markets? Many--and in some cases no doubt 
arbitrary--choices would have to be made here. Worse, many of the export-promoting policy 
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database. Notice that those trading partners potentially affected by a measure are 
not identified. This fact, plus the use of de minimus thresholds for trade, 
investment, and migration levels, further reduce the number of recorded trading 
partners affected.  
How representative is the GTA database of contemporary crisis-era 
protectionism? While at present no definite answer can be given to this question, 
readers may find the following observations useful in making their assessment of 
this important matter. First, to the extent that any state initiatives are not 
discovered by the GTA team then the database will under-report the number of 
discriminatory state measures and tariff lines, sectors, and trading partners 
affected. Likewise, a state initiative may exist, be investigated, and its contents 
not verified, in which case it will not be recorded in the GTA database. If 
anything these considerations imply that the GTA database will understate the 
scale of contemporary protectionism, a point worth bearing in mind when 
interpreting the findings in section 3. Second, any variation across the GTA team 
in the vigor with which they identify and investigate state initiatives may affect 
the composition of the database. Third, nations differ in the extent to which they 
make public (through statements, website postings, etc) state initiatives. Likewise, 
WTO members may vary in their propensity and speed to meet their notification 
obligations to that organization. The GTA team has begun an analysis of the 
representativeness of its database.  
The purpose of this section has been to describe the manner by which the 
GTA team has assembled an extensive evidential base on crisis-era protectionism. 
Inevitably such an endeavor involves making numerous design choices, the most 
important of which have been described here.11 The entries in that database have 
been carefully categorized so as to facilitate comparison and assessment of the 
prevalence and consequences of different forms of crisis-era protectionism. 
                                                                                                                                     
instruments reported in the GTA database cover lots of sectors of the implementing jurisdiction, 
further complicating these calculations. Finally, just because the total value of imports potentially 
affected by an anti-dumping investigation into one product line from one trading partner seems 
easy to identify does not imply that calculating the amount of trade affected by the wide set of 
GTA measures is as simple. The last observation is particularly pertinent given the small 
proportion of trade remedy measures implemented during the period November 2008-September 
2009. Put another way, a serious attempt to calculate the total amount of commerce affected in the 
past year by contemporary discriminatory measures is going to require some difficult, and perhaps 
hard to defend, design choices. 
11 Not every user may concur with the design choices of the GTA team or, for other reasons, may 
want to focus on a subset of the GTA database. The advanced search function of the GTA 
database has been deliberately designed to accommodate many such preferences, allowing certain 
types of policy instruments, sectors, and jurisdictions to be excluded from any of the reports 
generated. 
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3. The emerging contours of crisis-era protectionism. 
With 428 state initiatives investigated it should be possible to discern some of the 
principal features of crisis-era protectionism. Having said that, the picture that 
emerges may be modified over time as more state interventions are investigated 
by the GTA team and so what follows is best thought of as a summary of the state 
initiatives announced between November 2008 and September 2009. During this 
period the avoidance of risk in financial markets resulted in far less credit being 
made available to other sectors of the economy, dire expectations of future 
economic performance resulted in reduced investment and consumer outlays, and 
there was a sharp reduction in world trade in the first half of 2009.  
Of the 428 investigated initiatives, 280 have been implemented implying 
that there were 148 measures in the pipeline, that is announced but, as of 15 
September 2009, not yet implemented. Of the 280 investigated state measures, 40 
were color-coded green, that is, the measures involved liberalization on a Most 
Favored Nation basis, improved transparency of a national trade regime, or no 
change in the discrimination against foreign commercial interests. It would be 
incorrect to assert, therefore, that the every reaction to the global economic 
downturn has been to close markets and engage in beggar-thy-neighbor behavior. 
Tariff reductions (in particular for parts, components, and raw materials) and 
reforms to foreign direct investment regimes were the most prevalent forms of 
liberalization observed.12 A number of reports of the national budgets in Sub-
Saharan Africa show the steps being taken to integrate the economies in question 
further into world markets. 
The ratio of the total number of discriminatory measures (color-coded red) 
to the total number of measures that might benefit trading partners (color-coded 
green) is approximately five to one. Furthermore, when one adds to the 192 of the 
former the 48 implemented measures that are likely to harm foreign commercial 
interests (color-coded amber), the overwhelming tendency during this crisis to 
reduce cross-border commercial opportunities becomes apparent (see Table 1). 
The data summarized in Table 1 also implies that of the measures 
implemented to date, trade remedies represent a relatively small share (14 
percent). Moreover, the G-20 countries together account for two-thirds of 
discriminatory measures implemented. Very few tariff lines, economic sectors, 
and trading partners have not been affected by some form of discriminatory policy 
instrument since November 2008, indicating the worldwide reach of current 
protectionist dynamics. 
In addition to the announced and implemented discriminatory state 
initiatives, 134 of the 148 pending measures are likely to harm foreign 
                                                
12 It being understood that reductions in tariffs on raw materials and intermediate goods could, in 
fact, increase the effective rate of protection enjoyed by final goods producers.  
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commercial interests when implemented. Given that approximately 70 harmful 
measures have been implemented per quarter during 2009, the potentially harmful 
measures in the pipeline represent up to another half a year of protectionism. 
These measures will start to influence global commerce even if governments were 
able to resist announcing any more initiatives that discriminated against foreign 
commercial interests (see Figure 1). 
In terms of policy instruments used to discriminate against foreign 
commercial interests, Table 2 demonstrates that a variety of methods have been 
employed since November 2008. Focusing on a few policy instruments (such as 
anti-dumping investigations or tariff rises), therefore, is likely to provide an 
inaccurate impression of the prevalence of, and probably the harm done by, 
contemporary protectionism. A cumulative picture ought to be developed.  
Of those implemented to date, bailouts, state aids, and other forms of 
financial assistance were the most popular discriminatory policy instrument13, 
followed by tariff measures and then trade remedies. Two of the top three most 
used policy instruments often involve the use of discretion on the part of 
implementing agencies. The associated lack of transparency and predictability 
that typically arises from the exercise of such discretion has led some observers14 
to worry about the prevalence of "murky protectionism" during the recent crisis, 
and arguably the evidence in Table 2 accords with this concern. 
Seven different policy instruments are expected to have harmed over 100 
trading partners, two of them by promoting national exports rather than curtailing 
imports. Moreover, there are far from perfect correlations between the number of 
times a policy instrument has been used in a discriminatory manner, and the 
number of trading partners, tariff lines, and economic sectors affected. This 
reflects the fact that some of less frequently used policy instruments have 
distorted commerce in substantial numbers of products and sectors (see the lower 
part of Table 2). Once again this points to the perils of focusing on a limited 
subset of policy instruments--perhaps because they are easier to measure or easier 
to think through than others--when assessing the scale of contemporary 
protectionism. 
There appears to be a difference between the beggar-thy-neighbor policy 
instruments that governments have resorted to when the credit markets had dried 
up and the measures in the pipeline. Contrasting Figures 2 and 3 it becomes 
evident that trade remedies will almost surely play a more prominent role in the 
coming year than in the previous one. Perhaps the "scramble for cash" (that arises 
because many corporate outlays are made before revenues are received) is being 
                                                
13 Of the 62 state initiatives offering some form of public financial assistance, 34 do not target the 
financial sector. There may also be state initiatives whose beneficiaries are in the financial and 
non-financial sectors.  
14 See, for example, Baldwin and Evenett (2009) and several of the contributions therein. 
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replaced by the more traditional "scramble for rents". As argued later, traditional 
barriers may be more effective at delivering the latter rather than the former. The 
more general point is that there is likely to be a change in the overall composition 
of cross-border commercial discrimination which cautions against accepting any 
explanation that cannot account for changes in this composition over time.  
In terms of the sectoral impact of protectionism, Table 3 is revealing. Apart 
from the financial sector, which has received plenty of state aid during the crisis, 
six of the top 10 affected sectors are traditionally associated with high levels of 
protection from foreign competition. The same is true for six of the next 10 
sectors to be most affected by discriminatory measures. As Aggarwal and Evenett 
(2009) have argued, this finding casts doubt on overall relevance of defenses of 
the use of discriminatory state measures on the grounds of nurturing "growth 
poles" or the "green economy." Most of the beneficiaries of crisis-era 
protectionism are the very smokestack manufacturing, textiles and apparel, and 
agricultural sectors that for decades have received above average levels of 
protection. 
With respect to the targets of discriminatory state measures, China stands 
out (see Table 4). Just under 100 foreign state initiatives target Chinese 
commercial interests, with another 77 in the pipeline. Fifty-six countries have 
taken measures that have harmed China's trading interests. Only the United States 
comes close in terms of being targeted by so many trading partners (49 in this 
case). Still, several economies in the European Union and Japan have seen their 
commercial interests harmed over 70 times since November 2008. 
Four indicators of the harm done by a nation to its trading partners' 
commercial interests are recorded in the GTA database (see Table 5). From these 
indicators four rankings can be generated of  the countries that have implemented 
the most almost-discriminatory measures and affected the most tariff lines, 
economic sectors, and trading partners with such discriminatory measures. 
Depending on the matter at hand, readers may wish to place different weights on 
each of these four rankings. Comparing across them, it is noteworthy that 
Indonesia is always in the top 5 worst offenders. China and Russia are always in 
the top 10 of each ranking; Germany and India are in the top 10 of three of the 
four rankings. Of the 18 nations mentioned in these rankings of worst offenders, 
12 took the G-20's no protectionism pledge.  
To summarize, the purpose of this section has been to describe the main 
findings of the GTA's database on contemporary crisis-era protectionism. In short, 
this establishes the facts that any proposed explanation ought to account for. The 
following section examines whether our understanding of protectionism needs to 
evolve in the light of these facts. 
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4. Four hypotheses concerning the resort to beggar-thy-neighbor policy 
instruments. 
The facts reported above are now employed to assess the possible underlying 
casual processes responsible for the resort by governments to discriminatory 
policy instruments since November 2008. To what extent, if at all, does our 
understanding of protectionism need to be modified in the light of the state 
intervention taken in response to the recent sharp global economic downturn? Are 
the factors that determine the resort to protectionism in a systemic economic crisis 
different from those at work during a "typical" business downturn? To date, it 
appears that governments have not resorted to the sort of across-the-board tariff 
increases witnessed during the 1930s, why is this so? Analysts will no doubt be 
reflecting on these questions, and others, for years to come. To focus the 
following discussion, four hypotheses concerning the resort to protectionism are 
evaluated in the light of the evidence contained in the GTA database. 
The first hypothesis, ably advanced by Eichengreen and Irwin (2009), 
contends that resort to widespread protectionism in the 1930s was greater in those 
nations where exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies were more 
constrained.15 On this view, protectionism was used in the 1930s as a 
macroeconomic tool to stimulate aggregate demand by switching expenditure 
from imports to the produce of domestic firms. Macroeconomic management, 
then, is privileged over special interest explanations for the outbreak of 1930s 
protectionism. Since the policy constraints of the 1930s rarely find counterparts in 
jurisdictions today, so the argument goes, there has been little need to resort to 
across-the-board protectionism.  
On the face of it, some contemporary experience bears out this hypothesis.16 
With the possible exception of Ukraine, no other country has resorted during the 
current crisis to across-the-board tariff increases on a scale witnessed in the 
1930s; the Smoot-Hawley tariff increases being an example of the latter and 
involving an average tariff increase of six percent. 
Can this hypothesis also account for the cross-country variation in the 
propensity of governments to resort to discriminatory policy instruments? The 
first hypothesis implies that, the greater is the capacity of governments to 
implement aggressive monetary and fiscal policies17 then resort to expenditure-
                                                
15 Recall that in the early 1930s the prevailing macroeconomic orthodoxy called for membership 
of the Gold Standard and for balanced government budgets.  
16 See also the footnote at the end of the next paragraph. 
17 Unless one is prepared to argue that the decision to stop the gradual appreciation of the Chinese 
renminbi is an example of crisis-driven exchange rate manipulation, it would be difficult to argue 
that flexibility in exchange rates is the reason why governments have not resorted to widespread 
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switching discriminatory policy instruments ought be less. Bearing in mind the 
different types of protectionist measures imposed since November 2008, assume 
that greater reliance overall on expenditure-switching discriminatory policies is 
associated with more discriminatory measures being imposed, with more tariff 
lines being affected by such measures, with more economic sectors so affected, 
and with a greater number of trading partners' commercial interests being harmed. 
With this assumption, if this hypothesis is correct then those countries that could 
not pursue aggressive monetary and fiscal policies during the recent crisis should 
be better represented in the rankings reported in Table 5 of countries inflicting the 
most harm through discriminatory policy instruments. Consulting this table, 
however, reveals many highly ranked countries that have clearly been able to 
relax their monetary and fiscal policies, namely, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK, 
China, Japan, Russia, the USA, and France. Something else must be going on, 
beyond the noble goal of macroeconomic management.18 
The second hypothesis concerning contemporary protectionism hinges on 
changes in the organization of firms that have taken place over the past 20 or so 
years with the rise of both international outsourcing and supply chain 
management. Baldwin and Evenett (2009), amongst others, have argued that the 
cost levels of contemporary manufacturers are significantly influenced by the 
costs of parts and components, many of which happen to be sourced from abroad. 
Firms supplying parts and components have a strong interest in keeping costs 
down and outsourcing has became a pervasive corporate strategy, so opposition to 
any proposals to raise tariffs on intermediate goods and raw materials has grown. 
Cross-border corporate reorganization, itself a consequence of pre-crisis trade 
reforms, accounts on this view for the reluctance of "Factory Asia" and the 
industrialized countries to raise tariffs during this crisis.  
To what extent does this explanation provide a satisfactory explanation for 
contemporary protectionist dynamics? In favor of the second hypothesis is the 
continuing reluctance of governments to raise tariffs on intermediate goods. 
Moreover, as noted earlier, the GTA database contains a number of instances 
when governments have lowered tariffs and charges on intermediate goods and 
                                                                                                                                     
protectionism since November 2008. (This statement should not be read as meaning that the 
nominal exchange rates of every major trading nation have been stable throughout the past year. 
The US dollar and British pound have fluctuated considerably and while concerns where 
expressed for a short while that the British were devaluing their currency such fears did not 
persist.) Monetary and fiscal policy must, therefore, carry the argument in this current crisis. 
18 Defenders of the first hypothesis may well take the inclusion of Indonesia, Argentina, Ukraine, 
Ecuador, Belarus and possibly Mexico as evidence in favor of their proposition if it were the case 
that these countries' governments were either less able to borrow on open markets than most and 
where aggressive monetary policies would be more likely to lead to nominal exchange rate 
collapses than most. The arguments made here and in the main text are suggestive of a more 
formal econometric evaluation of the first hypothesis.  
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raw materials. However, this argument is silent on the largest form of 
discriminatory measures implemented, namely, financial assistance measures and 
a review of the stated rationales for advancing such assistance does not provide 
much support for this hypothesis (recall Table 2).19 Worse, this explanation is 
hard to square with the 12 discriminatory measures taken by governments since 
November 2008 to increase the use of locally-sourced parts, components, and raw 
materials (Table 2 again). In fact, the combination of the additional spending as 
part of stimulus packages with Buy National provisions and tighter rules on local 
content, as seen in the United States amongst others, provides stronger incentives 
to unravel international supply chains and to repatriate production. Again, 
something is missing; at best, the second hypothesis is incomplete. Instead of 
taking corporate reorganization as a determinant of contemporary protectionism, 
future analyses might consider the extent to which influencing corporate 
reorganization has itself become a motive underlying policy choices during the 
global economic downturn. 
A third hypothesis is that the choice of protectionist policy instruments have 
been influenced by entrenched corporate interests using the circumstances of the 
crisis to target rival foreign firms from export powerhouses and to shift the burden 
of capacity reduction on to others. Central to this argument is that the measures 
sought by corporate interests are selective; targeting imports from selected foreign 
sources or acquiring enough financial assistance to resist adjustment while others 
(including domestic rivals) succumb. On this view, discrimination need not be 
across-the-board or widespread, but could become or appear so if the aggregate 
effect of numerous selective interventions was sizeable. Moreover, such corporate 
interests might be opposed to governments resorting to across-the-board 
discrimination with transparent policy instruments (such as tariffs) for fear of 
inducing retaliation from abroad. Better, then, to seek selective and murky forms 
of discrimination. 
On the face of it, this hypothesis might have a lot going for it. The targeting 
of China, the United States, and Germany (home to some of the world's most 
successful exporting firms) accords with the third hypothesis (recall Table 4). 
Selective financial packages to manufacturing firms, often discriminating between 
firms located in a jurisdiction as well as between jurisdictions, have played a 
prominent role after November 2008 (recall Figure 2). 
The problem with the third hypothesis is timing. The principal measures to 
selectively target specific trading partners--anti-dumping duties, countervailing 
duties, and China-specific safeguards--represent only a small fraction of the 
discriminatory measures implemented during the period November 2008 to 
                                                
19 However, there is one Japanese state initiative listed in the GTA database that was deliberately 
designed to offer funds to Malaysian firms that are integrated into the supply chains of Japanese 
multinationals. 
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September 2009 (Figure 2 again). To the extent that these selective measures 
require a demonstration of injury to a domestic industry that is attributed to 
imports, it is difficult to make such a case when imports are falling, as they were 
for many products in many jurisdictions during the first half of 2009. In contrast, 
with the stabilization (and in some cases increases) in trade in the third quarter of 
2009, such demonstrations may become easier to make. In fact, it is interesting to 
note that over half of the pending state initiatives likely to harm foreign 
commercial interests in the GTA database are trade remedies, many of which 
allow for the selective targeting of foreign trading partners (recall Figure 3). The 
third hypothesis, then, may perform better in the next twelve months than in the 
past year. 
The fourth hypothesis puts at the center stage certain consequences of the 
financial crisis, arguing that they influenced the choice of discriminatory policy 
instruments. When the financial markets froze in late 2008 the amount of credit, 
including working capital and trade finance needed by firms to cover their 
expenses before revenues were received, advanced to the private sector fell 
considerably. Without such credit and other sources of funds, the non-financial 
private sector would begin laying off employees, delaying (and possibly 
defaulting on) payments to other firms, and cutting back on investment outlays. 
Seeking to limit the harm to the "real economy" and bearing in mind that firms' 
needs varied within sectors as well across sectors, governments undertook direct 
interventions that selectively delivered "cash" to the non-financial private sector. 
For those governments with the means to do so, or those nations with banking 
systems where credit could be directed without inducing a widespread withdrawal 
of deposits, direct payments, loans, and credit guarantees were the fastest means 
to deliver cash to those firms in need of it. Selective financial interventions 
become prominent precisely because "All you need is cash" during the depths of 
the recent financial crisis (as the cover of The Economist magazine put in its 1 
November 2008 edition) and other forms of state intervention would have been 
slower and less targeted in delivering funds to tide firms over. 
At best this hypothesis accounts for the widespread resort to financial 
assistance packages in the industrialized countries and in China (were the banking 
system meets the conditions described above). As means of delivering cash 
quickly the alternatives to financial assistance are found wanting. Trade remedies 
take time to investigate and often require a period of rising imports to justify the 
imposition of measures. Tariff increases shift sales to domestic firms, but the 
same financial crisis may discourage domestic and foreign customers from 
purchasing, so the overall impact on the revenues of domestic firms is uncertain. 
Worse, the amount of extra sales and profits that tariffs can deliver is bounded (at 
that levels associated with the elimination of tariffs with a prohibitive tariff.) 
Stimulus packages take time to legislate and time to implement, especially if state 
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funds are transferred between levels of government. In the light of these practical 
considerations, financial assistance is the preferred means to attain a specific, 
crisis-related end, namely, cash. Other than the European Union's state aid rules, 
which were soon overwhelmed and scaled back in late 2008, the weaknesses of 
extant multilateral rules on subsidies reinforced the attractiveness of this option.20 
It may be fruitful to combine the third and fourth hypotheses and to posit 
that when national output began to fall sharply then the objectives of firms 
seeking state intervention changed from cash to rents (from selectively targeting 
rivals).21 On this view the purpose of the financial assistance was initially to 
provide needed cash and subsequently to encourage rival firms to undertake more 
of the capacity reduction that became necessary in many sectors as the global 
economy contracted. This was coupled with the selective targeting of imports to 
reallocate market shares in home markets. For presentational purposes these 
interventions could be wrapped up in packages--sometimes referred to as 
industrial policy--but in many cases they amount to the resort to selective, 
discriminatory intervention in support of influential corporate groups and 
associated trade unions. Should the pending state initiatives identified by GTA be 
implemented, then such a combined hypothesis might account for the implied 
change in the composition of discriminatory measures that is likely to be observed 
over the next 12 months or so. 
The purpose of this section has been to examine how our understanding of 
protectionist dynamics might have to evolve in the light of state interventions 
taken during the recent global economic crisis. To sharpen the arguments the 
discussion here was organized around four hypotheses, that are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. The fact that governments have used a range of policy 
instruments since November 2008 was useful in highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of several hypotheses. Moreover, the specific and acute 
circumstances of the recent global financial crisis were an important reminder that 
the problems that governments seek to address during systemic crises may be 
different from typical business cycle downturns, with direct implications for the 
likelihood of choosing one discriminatory policy instrument over another.  
                                                
20 Nothing in this paragraph should be taken to imply that selective financial assistance does not 
distort the allocation of resources or is the least damaging policy option from the perspective of 
resource allocation. The arguments concerning the attractiveness of selective financial assistance 
packages to policymakers were made on other grounds. 
21 Notice the formulation is not "cash plus customers" as the maximum amount of customer 
switching would occur if MFN trade restrictions were applied. To the extent that an industry's 
firms encourage a government to resort to traditional safeguards or other MFN trade restrictions 
then the "cash plus customers" formulation might have some explanatory power. 
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5. Assessing international trade rules and accords in the light of 
contemporary protectionism. 
During the recent sharp economic downturn to what extent, if at all, have national 
policy choices been influenced by binding multilateral trade rules and other 
international accords on commercial policy? To what extent has contemporary 
protectionism been influenced by the binding rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the more informal no-protectionism pledge of the G-20 
countries? The answers to these questions may alter our understand the "bite" of 
existing international accords and influence our assessment of the merits and 
viability of potential future trade-related initiatives. Drawing upon the evidence 
presented earlier, the purpose of this section is to offer some observations on these 
matters. 
With respect to the bindings on tariffs on non-agricultural goods made by 
members of the WTO, a number of remarks are in order. The first is that, in the 
past year, to the best of our knowledge no government has raised its tariffs above 
the bindings that it had previously committed to. On the face of it this is good 
news, until one realizes the significant latitude the great majority of WTO 
members have to raise tariffs without exceeding their bindings. In recent times 
many comparisons have been made to the 1930s, presumably to provide some 
perspective. In this spirit it is worth noting that the Smoot Hawley tariff increases 
of 1930 raised US tariffs by on average six percentage points. How many WTO 
members could implement a Smoot Hawley-sized tariff increase now and not 
exceed their tariff bindings? According to the World Tariff Profiles 2008, 
available on the WTO website, of the 124 trading jurisdictions22 for which data is 
available, only 21 have average bound tariff rates that are less than six percent 
higher than their average applied tariff rates. Put another way, there is so much 
latitude to raise tariffs in current tariff bindings that 103 jurisdictions could copy 
Messrs. Smoot and Hawley and not break their WTO obligations. If the Smoot 
Hawley tariff is the standard, then for these 103 jurisdictions it is very doubtful 
that current tariff bindings are much of a constraint on national policymaking. 
Some might be tempted to salvage part of the argument concerning the bite 
of tariff bindings by contending that the policy choices of the other 18 
jurisdictions, which include six industrialized country jurisdictions (including the 
European Union) and many of the recently acceding countries (including China), 
have been influenced by these multilateral trade commitments. This claim is not 
very persuasive for the industrialized countries in question and China because, as 
argued earlier, another policy instrument (financial assistance) had clear 
advantages over tariffs in terms of meeting the specific challenges facing non-
financial companies during the past year. There was no risk of these countries 
                                                
22 In this publication the members of the European Union are treated as a single trading entity.  
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breaking their tariff bindings so long as the challenge of providing cash to firms 
was better accomplished by another available policy instrument. At most, then, 
the tariff bindings can be said to have constrained the behavior of some of the 
recently acceded members. Even there, as the case of Ukraine demonstrates, these 
countries can resort to other WTO-legal policy instruments that enable them to 
raise tariffs substantially. In sum, the patterns of contemporary protectionism and 
available legal loopholes cast doubt on any claims that the WTO tariff bindings 
have constrained policy choices during the recent global economic downturn. 
The incomplete nature of the corpus of many WTO agreements is another 
feature that must be taken into account when assessing the bite of existing 
multilateral trade rules. The fact that the WTO's rules on subsidies are limited in 
reach and that the plurilateral disciplines on government procurement extend only 
partially to sub-national governments suggest that it would be more accurate to 
contend that, since November 2008, governments have chosen policy instruments 
that evade WTO rules rather test them. Moreover, without an expansion of the 
WTO rules into these areas, it is difficult to see why governments would not 
resort to bailouts and discriminatory fiscal stimulus packages (including buy 
national policies) again in a comparable future financial crisis. Overall, 
expectations of the impact of current multilateral trade rules on government 
choices made during systemic economic crises should be tempered accordingly. 
One reaction to the last paragraph's conclusion is to argue that the world 
economy would benefit from more far-reaching, binding multilateral trade rules. 
Despite being sympathetic to this position for a long time, one prominent episode 
from the past year casts doubt on political viability of strengthening WTO rules 
on those policy instruments where discrimination has been rife. The emasculation, 
during the straightened days of late 2008, of the stringent state aids regime of the 
European Union requires careful examination. The challenge to those seeking 
further binding trade rules to prevent future governments from repeating their 
recent choices of discriminatory policy instruments is to show that their proposals 
will prevail when confronted with the extraordinary pressure that governmental 
leaders simultaneously face to intervene selectively during systemic economic 
crises. Ostracizing individual rule-breakers is one thing, confronting group 
violations risks repudiation of the binding rule in question.  
More generally in an acute financial crisis, when the fate of banks and other 
firms may be decided over weekends between the close of the financial markets in 
New York and their subsequent opening in Tokyo, is it realistic to expect that 
associated rushed decision-making will respect the WTO principles of 
transparency and non-discrimination? Furthermore, if any binding rules were 
violated during a systemic economic crisis, and the consequences of such 
violations were economically significant and potentially hard to reverse (such as 
if some firms exit a sector as a result), what value would policymakers attach to 
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dispute settlement findings rendered 18 months or so later? In short, there is 
probably a significant mismatch between the current negotiating, deliberative, and 
dispute settlement practices of the WTO and the imperatives of government 
decision-making during a crisis. Positive answers to the questions posed above are 
needed before expansions in the scope of the WTO's binding rules could 
realistically be expected to influence government choices during a systemic 
economic crisis.  
Another reaction is to argue that the solution is not more binding rules, but 
rather more informal understandings between governments (or at least between 
the governments of the largest trading nations) to eschew protectionism in times 
of economic crisis or to limit resort to discriminatory policy instruments. 
Supporters of this view might point to the non-binding G-20 pledge to avoid 
protectionism for the duration of the current crisis23; a commitment reiterated 
often since it was first articulated at the G-20 summit in Washington D.C. in 
November 2008. Some assert that resort to protectionism by G-20 governments 
would have been higher in the absence of this no-protectionism pledge. Had the 
GTA database contained observations before November 2008 it might have been 
possible to examine whether there were any breaks in state decision-making after 
the pledge was taken; for example, by considering whether the propensity to 
implement discriminatory policy instruments became less sensitive to economic 
conditions after the pledge.  
The absence of a compelling counterfactual is, however, not the end of the 
matter. Other features of contemporary protectionism reported in the GTA 
database cast doubt on whether the pledge by G-20 heads of government could 
ever work. The starting point is to recall the variety of discriminatory policy 
instruments employed since November 2008. Many of the key decisions 
concerning these policy instruments were not taken state agencies controlled by 
the head of government. In fact, some of those agencies are formally independent 
of central government and, absent a change in legislation, would be under no 
obligation to comply with the G-20 no-protectionism pledge. For example, in 
many nations the agency responsible for deciding whether to impose trade 
remedies is independent of government and, therefore, what reason is there to 
believe such agencies' propensities to discriminate against foreign commercial 
interests would change after November 2008? Similar considerations apply to the 
discrimination against foreign commercial interests implemented by sub-national 
governments (through, for example, buy local policies and financial assistance to 
local firms) and by independent central banks and financial regulators (through 
discriminatory bailouts of financial institutions).  
                                                
23 G-20 members have never made it clear what was meant by this pledge. In fact, it may be the 
case that the pledge was articulated without any common meaning being agreed. Analysts may 
therefore make the mistake of inferring what they think G-20 members meant by this pledge!  
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In other cases the head of government must decide which policy instruments 
to implement in collaboration with other independent decision-makers. Decisions 
made with national legislatures in presidential systems of government are cases in 
point; here head of governments may find themselves reluctantly accepting the 
inclusion of discriminatory provisions in legislation, such as fiscal stimulus 
packages. In the case of the European Union, the majority of member states are 
not even part of the G-20 and may not feel bound by the no-protectionism pledge. 
Once again, commitments by heads of government to eschew protectionism lack 
credibility when the party making the pledge is not in control of the relevant 
decision-making processes. The critique here is not that the G-20 pledge did not 
work rather to question whether many heads of governments had the power to 
ever make it work. 
The murkiness of much contemporary protectionism exposes another 
weakness in the G-20 pledge, namely, verification. The fact that so little of 
contemporary protectionism is transparent (such as tariff increases) makes it more 
difficult to ascertain whether a G-20 member has violated the pledge. With 
limited verification one is entitled to ask how the anyone, including a party to the 
pledge, could know if the pledge has worked? Like its binding counterpart, the 
degree of influence over national decision-making of the G-20 pledge is limited 
by its incompleteness.  
To summarize, on the basis of the available evidence on crisis-era 
protectionism, there are reasons for doubting that nation states were meaningfully 
restrained by international trade rules and accords over the past year. 
Consequently our understanding of contemporary protectionism should give 
greater weight to domestic factors and imperatives.  
6. Concluding remarks. 
Profound economic and political shocks in an era of considerable international 
interdependence ought to provide an opportunity to evaluate and, where 
necessary, revise our understanding of protectionism. Using a substantial database 
of state initiatives announced since the first crisis-related G-20 summit in 
November 2008, this paper has sought to add to our understanding of the 
characteristics of contemporary protectionism and to start assessing its likely 
determinants. The world economy has yet to be restored to full health, and in the 
coming months and years fresh evidence may call for the propositions advanced 
here to be revisited. 
The multi-faceted nature of contemporary protectionism, the specific needs 
of companies that arise during a systemic financial crisis (as opposed to during a 
traditional business cycle downturn), and the relative importance of domestic 
imperatives as compared to international rules and other accords are central to an 
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understanding contemporary protectionist dynamics and the pervasive 
abandonment of the level playing field as a guiding principle for state 
intervention.  
Table 1.  Measures implemented since first crisis-related G20 summit in 
November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and for the G20 members. 
Statistic 
All jurisdictions G20 nations 
Total Total except unfair 
trade and safeguards 
investigations 
Total Total except unfair 
trade and safeguards 
investigations 
Total number of 
measures in GTA 
database 
280 231 172 133 
Total number of 
measures coded green 40 36 27 24 
Total number of 
measures coded amber 48 30 24 11 
Total number of 
measures coded red 192 165 121 98 
Total number (%) of 
4-digit tariff lines 
affected by almost 
certainly 
discriminatory 
measures 
1157 
(95%) 
1141  
(94%) 
926 
(76%) 
921  
(76%) 
Total number (%) of 
2-digit sectors 
affected by almost 
certainly 
discriminatory 
measures 
63 (80%) 63  (80%) 
58 
(73%) 
58  
(73%) 
Total number of 
trading partners 
affected by almost 
certainly 
discriminatory 
measures 
217 203 206 193 
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Figure 1. If the measures in the pipeline are implemented, the number of 
harmful measures will rise by more than half. 
In Figure 1 a harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented 
since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely 
to be discriminatory (coded amber). 
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Table 2. Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign 
commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting. 
Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed. 
Rank and 
measure 
Number 
of 
measures 
imple-
mented 
by type. 
Number 
of 
discrim-
inatory 
measures 
(classifie
d red) 
Number 
of 
countries 
that 
imposed 
these 
discrim-
inatory 
measures 
Number of 
countries 
harmed by 
these 
discrim-
inatory 
measures 
Percentage 
of tariff 
lines 
(product 
categories) 
affected by 
these 
discrim-
inatory 
measures 
Percentage 
of sectors 
affected 
by these 
discrim-
inatory 
measures 
1. Bail out/state 
aid measure 66 62 35 150 12 25 
2. Tariff 
measure 60 31 15 113 38 43 
3. Trade defense 
measure (AD, 
CVD, 
safeguard) 
50 28 40 101 24 39 
4. Public 
procurement/ 
Buy National 
policy 
16 12 11 133 30 34 
5. Non tariff 
barrier (not 
otherwise 
specified) 
17 11 7 109 22 36 
6. Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary 
measures 
11 10 8 17 1 8 
7. Export 
subsidy 11 9 31 144 17 21 
8. Migration 
measure 10 7 7 31 0 0 
9. Export taxes 
or restriction 14 6 9 146 22 22 
10. Import ban 6 6 5 34 10 27 
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Figure 2. Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign 
commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting. 
Figure 3. Top 10 pending measures that target foreign commercial interests. 
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Table 3: Sectors most affected by discriminatory measures. 
Rank, CPC code, and sector description
Number of 
implemen-ted 
measures 
affecting 
specified sector
Number of 
discrimin-
atory 
measures 
harming 
comer- 
cial interest 
in this sector 
Number of 
countries 
responsible 
for discrimin-
atory 
measures 
taken in this 
sector 
Number of 
pending 
measures 
affecting 
specified 
sector 
1.  81 (Financial intermediation 
services  and auxiliary services thereof) 31 29 13 1 
2. 21 (Meat, fish, fruit, veg. etc) 40 25 16 5 
3. 44 (Special purpose machinery) 52 25 16 11 
4. 01 (Products of agriculture) 40 22 17 7 
5. 23 (Grain mill products) 39 22 40 7 
6. 41 (Basic metals) 65 22 38 27 
7. 27 (Textile articles other than 
apparel) 36 19 13 7 
8. 34 (Basic chemicals) 54 19 12 20 
9. 42 (Fabricated metal products) 49 19 13 18 
10. 49 (Transport equipment) 50 19 13 16 
11. 38 (Furniture; other transportable  
goods n.e.c.) 30 18 13 5 
12. 47 (Radio  television and 
communication equipment and 
apparatus) 
29 18 10 6 
13. 22 (Dairy products) 27 17 40 5 
14. 28 (Knitted or crocheted fabrics; 
wearing apparel) 28 17 12 4 
15. 43 (General purpose machinery) 33 17 11 7 
16. 02 (Live animals and animal 
products) 25 16 41 4 
17. 29 (Leather and leather products; 
footwear) 24 15 11 2 
18. 36 (Rubber and plastics products)  28 15 13 7 
19. 46 (Electrical machinery and 
apparatus) 23 14 10 4 
20. 26 (Yarn and thread; woven and 
tufted textile fabrics) 33 12 9 10 
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Table 4. Top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures 
Target Number of 
discriminatory 
measures imposed on 
target 
Number of trading 
partners imposing 
discriminatory 
measures 
Number of pending 
measures which, if 
implemented, would 
harm target too 
1. China 99 56 77 
2. USA 86 49 19 
3. Germany 84 30 30 
4. France 78 29 24 
5. Japan 78 46 23 
6. Belgium 78 28 21 
7. UK 72 29 20 
8. Netherlands 71 28 18 
9. Italy 70 25 23 
10. Sweden 70 23 21 
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Table 5. Which countries have inflicted the most harm? 
Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect 
different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA 
reports four measures of harm. 
Rank Metric, Country in specified rank, Number 
Ranked by number of 
(almost certainly) 
discriminatory 
measures imposed 
Ranked by the 
number 
(percentage) of 
tariff lines (product 
categories) affected 
by (almost 
certainly) 
discriminatory 
measures 
Ranked by the 
percentage of 
sectors affected 
by (almost 
certainly) 
discriminatory 
measures 
Ranked by the 
number of trading 
partners affected 
by (almost 
certainly) 
discriminatory 
measures 
1. Russia (20) Ukraine 733 (60%) Algeria 54 
(68%) 
China (163) 
2. Germany (15) China 329 (27%) Ukraine 38 
(48%) 
India (141) 
3. India and Indonesia 
(10 each) 
Ecuador 312 (25%) Ecuador 30 
(37%) 
Indonesia (124) 
4. Indonesia 311 
(25%) 
Indonesia 25 
(31%) 
UK (123) 
5. Italy, Spain, and UK 
(9) 
Russia 258 (21%) Belarus and 
China 23 (29%) 
USA (120) 
6. India 210 (17%) Russia (117) 
7. Japan 133 (11%) Mexico 22 
(28%) 
Germany (116) 
8. China (8) UK 131 (11%) Germany 21 
(27%) 
Spain (108) 
9. Argentina (7) USA 124 (10%) Russia and USA 
19 (24%) 
France (106) 
10. Japan (7) Belarus 74 (6%) Poland (100) 
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